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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROSECUTORIAL
COMMENTS ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY-HARMLESS ERROR
STANDARD-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
prosecutorial comments regarding the defendant's failure to testify
result in prejudicial error and the burden then rests on the Com-
monwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was
harmless. Furthermore, if there was a finding that the improperly
admitted references could have in some way affected the outcome
of a verdict, the error could not be found to be harmless, regardless
of the weight of the evidence against the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d 141 (Pa. 1993).
J.S. was a mildly retarded blind woman with cerebral palsy, Vic-
toria Mason ("Mason") was a counselor, and Lisa Hughes
("Hughes") was a mentally handicapped woman.' The three
women shared an apartment.2 On June 18, 1986, Mason and
Hughes left J.S. home alone in their apartment and departed for
the grocery store.3 However, Mason and Hughes made several de-
tours prior to reaching the grocery store.4 During the course of
these escapades, Mason met Rodriguez and invited him back to
their apartment.5 Rodriguez allegedly raped J.S. at the apartment.'
1. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d 141 (Pa. 1993).
2. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 143.
3. Id.
4. Id. These detours included picking up another counselor, Gloria Breedlove
("Breedlove"), purchasing some marijuana, going to a bar where they met the defendant
and two of his friends, and finally going to Breedlove's apartment where the entire group
consumed alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 145. Mason's account of the events was as follows: Mason returned to her
apartment alone with Rodriguez. Id. Hughes remained at Breedlove's apartment. Id. Mason
engaged in sexual relations with Rodriguez. Id. She went to the bathroom leaving Rodriguez
alone in her room. Id. When she returned ten minutes later, he was not in her room. Id. She
discovered Rodriguez and J.S. in J.S.'s room, both naked on the bed. Id. J.S. told Mason
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J.S. met with a counselor the next day and accused Rodriguez of
rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.'
On September 12, 1986, Rodriguez was arrested for the rape of
J.S.8 He chose not to testify at his trial.9 This decision was based
primarily on what the defense perceived to be contradictions in the
Commonwealth's case and a lack of credibility of the Common-
wealth's witnesses. 10 During the prosecutor's closing argument, re-
peated references were made to the fact that Rodriguez had not
testified." The jury found Rodriguez guilty of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse and rape.'2 Rodriguez moved for a new trial
based on the prosecutor's remarks.' The trial court refused to
that Rodriguez had attempted to engage her in sexual relations. Id. Rodriguez denied that
anything improper had transpired. Id. Mason and Rodriguez then left J.S.'s room. Id.
However, J.S.'s account was as follows: Mason, Rodriguez, and Hughes returned to the
apartment. Id. Immediately prior to Rodriguez entering her room and assaulting her, J.S.
could hear Mason and Hughes in the kitchen unpacking groceries. Id. She testified that
Mason was not present in her room at any time during the attack. Id. After the attack,
Rodriguez simply got dressed and left her room. Id.
7. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 143.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 143. The contradictions consisted of the conflicting testimonies of J.S. and
Mason. Id. See note 6. The lack of credibility related to the fact that J.S. identified Rodri-
guez as being tall and skinny when, in fact, he was short and stout. Id.
11. Id. The record demonstrated that the following statements were made by the
prosecutor during his closing argument:
Well, first let's go back to the fact that he [defense counsel] said he may testify or he
may not testify. Does that sound like a lawyer for an innocent man? Mr. Rodriguez
has a lawyer and his job is to get him off the hook and they talk about this case and
they know what is going on. You sit there and you are an innocent person, you get up
and let your lawyer play games, he may testify, he may not, if we can beat it by him
testifying, we will do it. If we can't beat it that way, we are not going to let him
testify. It is his words that come back to haunt him. When you listen to what he says
he is jumping all around. That's what he is doing, playing criminal defense lawyer.
Don't let him do that. What did he say? Besides saying he may testify, he may not.
Let's see what happens. Now they decide that it is in their best interest that he
doesn't testify. That is fine, you can't hold it against him for not testifying, you can
hold Mr. Owens [defense counselor] back for what he said. So, they decided not to
testify. What's his defense . .
Id. at 143-44.
Several minutes later the prosecutor continued as follows:
He decides to run to Puerto Rico for four years, does that sound like what an inno-
cent man does? Does that sound like an innocent man or that he changes defenses
three times and has his lawyer. say if you can beat it without me testifying, do it; if
you can beat it with me testifying, do it; whatever it takes just beat it. Does that
sound like an innocent man?
Id. at 144.
12. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 143.
13. Id. at 143. The Commonwealth argued that Rodriguez waived his claim on this
assertion. Id. at 144. The supreme court stated, however, that it was apparent from the
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grant Rodriguez's motion based on a determination that the re-
marks constituted harmless error.1" Rodriguez then appealed to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 15 The superior court affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. 16 The court concluded that there was
a possibility that the prosecutor's comments contributed to the
verdict against Rodriguez; nevertheless, the court found the error
to be harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 7 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur1 8 to consider
whether reference by a prosecutor in closing argument to a defend-
ant's failure to testify fell within the boundaries of the harmless
error doctrine."m
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that the defendant
had a constitutional right to refuse to take the stand and that such
right was absolute and unquestionable.2" The court also affirmed
the established rule that the prosecutor was restricted from ad-
dressing such a refusal.21 Further, the court stated that when a
prosecutor did address the refusal, the burden was on the Com-
monwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was
record that the defense objected to the prosecutor's comments several times. Id. Hence, the
court concluded that the claim had not been waived. Id.
14. Id. at 144.
15. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 143.
16. Id. at 143. The superior court recognized that the prosecutor had committed a
prejudicial error in his closing remarks. Id. at 144. However, both the superior and trial
court determined that the error was nevertheless harmless and refused to grant Rodriguez's
request for a new trial. Id. On appeal, Rodriguez argued that the superior court erred in
concluding that prejudicial comments made by a prosecutor during his closing argument did
not constitute reversible error. Id. at 143.
17. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 601 A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 626
A.2d 141 (Pa. 1993).
18. Allocatur comes from the Latin for "it is allowed." BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 718
(6th ed. 1990). Allocatur is used to describe the allowance of appeal by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania for its review of the case. Id.
19. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 142.
20. Id. at 144. A defendant's right to refuse to testify is established by both the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: "No person
. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself . U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
Article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that the accused "cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself .... " PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
21. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 144. According to the Pennsylvania Judiciary Act, "[tihe
neglect or refusal of any defendant, actually upon trial in a criminal proceeding, to offer
himself as a witness, cannot be treated as creating any presumption against him, or be ad-
versely referred to by court or counsel during trial." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5941(a)
(1988). The court in Rodriguez relied on this section in rendering its decision. Rodriguez,
626 A.2d at 143.
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harmless.2 2
In reviewing the superior court's analysis, 23 the supreme court
determined that the lower court's reasoning was flawed; thus, the
conclusion it reached was erroneous.24 In so deciding, the supreme
court relied on definitions of harmless error that had been previ-
ously established.2 5 The supreme court stated that the superior
court's reasoning that although the error was harmless, the error
contributed to the verdict, was fatally flawed.26 The court held
that, by definition, harmless error could not contribute to the ver-
dict in any way.27 Hence, the court reasoned that if the error in
any way contributed to the verdict, it was not and could not be
harmless regardless of how overwhelming the evidence of guilt.28
Once the court determined that the lower court had erred in its
analysis of the harmless error doctrine, it examined whether a
proper application of the doctrine would affect the outcome of the
case. 29 The court concluded that the prosecutor's comments un-
22. Id. at 144.
23. Id. As previously discussed, the analysis employed was that although the prosecu-
tor's comments were prejudicial, they were nevertheless harmless. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court relied on it previous decision in Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d
155 (Pa. 1978), in reaching this conclusion. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 144. Story involved a
harmless error question in which the trial court improperly admitted evidence concerning
the victim's family life and professional reputation. Story, 383 A.2d at 155. There the court
held that "an error can be harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the error is harmless," and further concluded that an error can be harm-
less only if "the uncontradicted evidence of guilt [is] so overwhelming, and the prejudicial
effect of the improperly admitted evidence so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict." Id. at
161. See notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
The court later reiterated these requirements in Commonwealth v. Foy, 612 A.2d 1349
(Pa. 1992). The requirements as set forth in Foy were as follows:
(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other, untainted evidence
which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the prop-
erly admitted evidence and the uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming
and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the
error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Foy, 612 A.2d at 1352.
26. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 144-45.
27. Id. The court stated that "[ilt is impossible to determine that there is a possibil-
ity that the error contributed to the verdict, and at the same time determine that the error
was harmless." Id. at 145. The court added that "(t]he two findings are mutually exclusive."
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court maintained that a determination that the error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt was not to be made lightly. Id.
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questionably violated the defendant's basic rights." The court
found crucial the fact that the prosecutor not only mentioned the
defendant's failure to take the stand, but expounded on it at
length on several occasions during his closing argument.3 1
The court stated that these comments, compounded by the con-
flicting testimony and internal contradictions in the Common-
wealth's case, made it reasonably possible that the jury took the
prosecutor's comments into account in reaching a guilty verdict.
3 2
Accordingly, the supreme court held that the superior court erred
in its judgment that the prosecutor's comments constituted harm-
less error since the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.33 Hence, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the
lower court and ordered a new trial.
3 4
The doctrine of harmless error originated at common law, dating
back to the nineteenth century English courts.35 In fact, the King's
Bench first confronted the issue of harmless error in 1807 in Rex v.
Ball.3 Rex, a criminal case, involved the erroneous admission of
evidence.3 7 The court here held that a new trial must be granted if
the improper evidence admitted might have had an effect on the
jury.38 Nevertheless, the English courts did not adhere to any con-
crete harmless error standard until Crease v. Barrett"e was decided
30. Id. The court asserted that the right against self-incrimination is one of the most
protected rights of a criminal defendant. Id. at 145.
31. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 145. See note 11 and accompanying text for record of the
prosecutor's closing argument.
32. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 146. The court referred to the conflicting testimony of J.S.
and Mason and to J.S.'s inaccurate description of the defendant. Id. at 145. See note 9 for a
discussion of the perceived weaknesses in the Commonwealth's case.
33. Id. The court asserted that the error in this case was a rather significant one. Id.
For instance, the court pointed out that it had recently held, in Commonwealth v. Lewis,
598 A.2d 975 (Pa. 1991), that it could never be harmless error for a trial judge to fail to
instruct the jury not to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify when
such an instruction was requested. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 144 (citing Lewis, 598 A.2d at
975). Thus, the court concluded that a prosecutor's comments on such a failure would al-
most never fit within the requirements established for harmless error. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d
at 145.
34. Id. This was a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at
142.
35. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESs ERROR 4 (1970).
36. 168 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1807).
37. Rex, 168 Eng. Rep. at 721-22.
38. Id. The King's Bench declared that there must be a new trial if "the case without
such improper evidence were not so clearly made out, and the improper evidence might be
supposed to have had an effect on the minds of the jury." Id. at 722.
39. 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
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in 1835.40 In Crease, the appellate court was faced with the issue of
whether the trial court had erred in excluding evidence that sup-
ported the defendant's case. 41 The court determined that the error
was not harmless despite very strong evidence that supported the
jury's verdict for the plaintiff.42 The court reasoned that it was not
clear that if the defendant's evidence had been received that it
would not have had an effect on the jury.43 Thus, the court recog-
nized the basic question involved in determining whether an error
was harmless was the effect the error had on the jury."
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with a harm-
less error question for the first time in 1897 in Bram v. United
States.45 In Bram, the Court was faced with the issue of whether
admission of an involuntary confession into the record constituted
reversible error. 46 The Court rejected the government's argument
that the improper admission of any involuntary confession in a
criminal trial should constitute harmless error.47 Instead, the Su-
preme Court held that automatic reversal was required if evidence
was improperly admitted and the admission involved a constitu-
40. Crease, 149 Eng. Rep. at 1354.
41. Id. at 1355. The plaintiff demanded a toll on tin that the defendant had extracted
from a mine that was allegedly part of the plaintiff's land. Id. The defendant alleged that
the property in question was not part of the plaintiff's land, and therefore, the defendant
had no duty to pay a toll. Id. The trial court, however, refused to permit the defendant to
introduce into evidence a lease, executed to him by the Prince of Wales, in which the Prince
admitted that the property in question was not part of the plaintiff's property. Id.
42. Id. The plaintiff had introduced entries from a weighing book recording tolls that
had been paid on tin removed from the mine on his property by tinners to a preceding lease.
Id. The plaintiff also introduced evidence of "an ancient immemorial custom" that upon
due notice any tinner could mine tin within the waste of a manor, however, such mining was
subject to a toll on the tin extracted. Id.
43. Id. at 1356.
44. Id. The court in Crease adopted a kind of "beyond all doubt" standard that al-
lowed the court the discretion to determine whether or not an error was harmful or prejudi-
cial. TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 6-7. Traynor maintained that the courts, in both England
and the United States, misinterpreted the holding in Crease and for fear of "invading on the
province of the jury" reversed judgments for the most trivial of errors. Id. at 13. Unfortu-
nately, this misinterpretation led to an almost automatic reversal of any error, however triv-
ial, by the courts in England and in the United States. Id. at 6-7.
45. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See Stephen Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA.
L. REV. 988 (1973), which contains a broad analysis of the history of the harmless error
doctrine.
46. Brain, 168 U.S. at 532. This case involved the murder of a sea captain that was
committed aboard a United States ship. Id. at 534. The defendant, the first officer of the
ship, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Id. The defendant appealed the
conviction arguing that his confession was involuntary and, as such, erroneously admitted
into evidence. Id. at 540.
47. Id.
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tional right of the defendant. 8
Three years after the Brain decision was handed down, the Su-
preme Court delineated an exception to the general rule set forth
in that case in Motes v. United States.49 In this case, the Court
was faced with the issue of whether the erroneous admission of tes-
timony injurious to the defendant's case constituted reversible er-
ror when the defendant had already signed a voluntary confession
of guilt.50 The evidence that the defendant complained of was the
written testimony of a witness for the prosecution who did not ap-
pear at trial."' The Court held that, notwithstanding the involve-
ment of the defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with
any witness against him, conclusive proof of the defendant's guilt
had already been established; hence, the admission of the testi-
mony into evidence was of no consequence, and as such was
harmless.2
Several years before the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sions in Bram and Motes, it faced for the first time the issue of
whether a defendant's refusal to testify could be used against him.
48. Id. at 541. English common law also followed this strict automatic reversal rule
until Parliament adopted the Judicature Act of 1873. TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 8. The
Judicature Act of 1873 read as follows: "A new.trial shall not be granted on the ground of
the misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless in the
opinion of the Court to which application is made, some substantial wrong or miscarriage
has been thereby occasioned on trial." TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 8 (citing 36 & 37 Vict.,
c. 66, rule 6, sched. 1).
*The rules governing harmless error in trials in England have been amended periodically
since the Judicature Act of 1873. TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 10. The provision of the
Judicature Act on harmless error now reads:
The Court of Appeal shall not be bound to order a new trial on the ground of misdi-
rection or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence or because the verdict of
the jury was not taken upon a question which the judge at trial was not asked to
leave to them unless in the opinion of the Court of Appeal some substantial wrong or
miscarriage has been thereby occasioned.
TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 10 (citing Stat. Instr. 1965, No. 1776 (L. 23) Rules of the
Supreme Court, 1965, Ord. 59, r. 11(2)).
However, the standard invoked by the English courts still necessitates "near certainty
that the error did not affect the judgment." TRAYNOR, cited at note 35, at 11.
49. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
50. Motes, 178 U.S. at 460.
51. Id. at 466. The defendant argued that this admission violated his rights under the
Sixth Amendment to be confronted with any witness against him. Id. at 474. However, the
testimony at issue was not in any way connected to the defendant's confession. Id. The
Court in affirming the defendant's conviction said that "[iut would be trifling with the ad-
ministration of criminal law to award him a new trial." Id. at 476.
52. Id. In Motes, there were a total of five defendants. Id. at 474. The other four
defendants did not sign confessions. Id. at 466. Accordingly, as to these four, the error was
reversed with instructions to grant a new trial. Id. at 474.
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In Wilson v. United States,53 the defendant was convicted in the
lower court of distributing lewd and obscene publications through
the mail.54 The defendant chose not to testify and the district at-
torney for the United States, in his closing argument, commented
on the failure of the defendant to take the stand.5 The defendant
appealed on the grounds that the failure of the trial court to forbid
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify after
the defense counsel had objected to it constituted reversible er-
ror. 56 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a
new trial. 57 In Wilson, the Supreme Court established the principle
that a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant's constitutional
right to refuse to testify against himself.
5 8
In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States promulgated
the first test for determining whether the erroneous admission of
illegally obtained evidence could ever be found harmless in Fahy v.
Connecticut." In Fahy, the petitioner was convicted of willfully
injuring a public building by painting swastikas on a synagogue.60
At trial, evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure was ad-
mitted into evidence.61 The Court adopted a standard which re-
quired a determination of whether there was a reasonable possibil-
ity that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction. 2 According to the Fahy test, if there was a reasonable
possibility that the evidence contributed to the verdict, then the
error could not be found harmless6 8
Further, in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan,"' the Supreme Court ex-
plained the significance of the defendant's right to refuse to testify.
In Malloy, the petitioner was on probation after he pled guilty to a
gambling charge.6 5 He was ordered to testify before a referee ap-
53. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
54. Wilson, 149 U.S. at 60.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 67.
58. Id.
59. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
60. Fahy, 375 U.S. at 85-86.
61. Id. at 88. This evidence consisted of a can of paint and a paint brush. Id.
62. Id. at 86-87.
63. Id. The Court held that "the erroneous admission of this unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence at this petitioner's trial was prejudicial; therefore, the error was not harm-
less, and the conviction must be reversed." Id. at 86.
64. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
65. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. The petitioner was officially convicted of pool selling, a
misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one year in jail. Id. This sentence was suspended after
90 days following which the petitioner was placed on probation for two years. Id.
Vol. 32:593600
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pointed by the state to investigate gambling activities within the
state.66 The petitioner refused to answer questions relating to the
circumstances of his arrest on the grounds that it might incrimi-
nate him. 7 The superior court held the petitioner in contempt and
incarcerated him until he was willing to answer the questions."
The petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus was denied
by the superior court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Er-
rors.6 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination was protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the states.70 Ac-
cordingly, following Malloy, states were no longer free to apply
their own laws to negate Fifth Amendment rights.71
One year later, the Supreme Court extended the application of
Malloy in Griffin v. California.72 The defendant in Griffin was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death after a trial in
which the prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to tes-
tify. 73 The specific issue faced by the Court was whether the com-
ment rule, adopted in California, which permitted the prosecutor
to make such references, was unconstitutional and as such was pro-





70. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. The Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, reads as
follows:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The court in Malloy went on to assert that "the same standards must determine whether
an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Malloy, 378 U.S. at
11.
71. Id. at 6.
72. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
73. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609-11. The Court recognized that if Griffin had been a fed-
eral trial, a reversible error would have been committed under Wilson. Id. at 612 (citing
Wilson, 149 U.S. 60 (1893)).
74. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613. In Griffin, the jury was instructed that:
[Als to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be
expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not
testify . . . the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate
the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be
reasonably draw therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.
Id. at 610.
This instruction was in compliance with article I, section 13 of the California Constitution
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Fifth Amendment barred both comment by the prosecution on the
defendant's failure to take the stand and instructions by the court
that such failure was evidence of guilt. 75 In addition, it extended
the prohibitions set forth in this holding to the states on the basis
of the holding in Malloy.7 6 Thus, states, bound, by the holdings in
Malloy and Griffin, could no longer permit comment on the ac-
cused's failure to testify. 7
Notwithstanding Malloy and Griffin, the Supreme Court still
had not determined whether comment during trial on the defend-
ant's refusal to testify could ever be found harmless. This question
was decided in 1967 by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. Califor-
nia.7 s Chapman involved two defendants who were convicted of
first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and simple kidnapping. 9
At trial, the prosecutor was permitted to comment on the defend-
ants' failure to take the stand.80 Shortly after the trial, but before
the case was considered on appeal, Griffin was decided.81 In Chap-
man, the California Supreme Court determined that although pur-
suant to Griffin an error had been committed by the trial court in
permitting comment on the accused's failure to testify, the error
was harmless under the California harmless error test.82 When the
case appeared before the United States Supreme Court, the Court
initially determined that the federal, rather than the state harm-
less error rule applied in this case.83 However, the Court declined
which provided "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the
jury." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Supreme Court held that this rule violated the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and as such was unconstitutional. Griffin,
380 U.S. at 613.
75. Id. at 615.
76. Id.
77. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
78. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
79. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19. One of the defendants was sentenced to life in prison,
and the other was sentenced to death. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 20. This provision reads as follows:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground of
misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for
any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure,
unless after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall
be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.5.
83. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. The Court stated that the error resulted in a denial of
rights granted by the Constitution. Id. Thus, the Court concluded:
Vol. 32:593
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to adopt a rule by which all federal constitutional errors would be
deemed harmful.8 4 Instead, it held that before a federal constitu-
tional error could be held harmless, the court must be able to de-
termine that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.8 5
In addition, the Court placed on the state the burden of establish-
ing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.86
While the Supreme Court was determining the proper harmless
error standard to apply to constitutional issues, the state courts
were struggling with both constitutional and non-constitutional
state law issues of harmless error. 7 The Pennsylvania court system
floundered in its application of a harmless error standard, not es-
tablishing a concrete, consistent standard for either federal consti-
tutional questions or state law questions until the latter half of the
twentieth century.8 Indeed, the courts of Pennsylvania decided
many harmless error questions in criminal cases from the turn of
the century until the 1970s without enunciating any type of con-
crete standard.'
In 1895, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth
v. Bowman" addressed the issue of whether a judge's charge to the
jury which erroneously stated that five witnesses, instead of two,
testified to a certain matter constituted reversible error.9 " Two wit-
We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these petitioners not to be punished
for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent-expressly
created by the Federal Constitution itself-is a federal right which, in the absence of
appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the
necessary rule.
Id.
84. Id. at 22. The Court concluded that there may be some constitutional errors
which in certain circumstances might be so unimportant or insignificant as to be deemed
harmless, and as such, not require automatic reversal. Id.
85. Id. at 24. The Court stated that it was simply expounding on the test previously
outlined in Fahy. Id. See notes 59-63 for a discussion of Fahy.
86. Id. Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, contended that a state test of harm-
less error did not present a federal question unless it failed to meet federal constitutional
requirements. Id. at 47-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. Saltzburg, cited at note 45, at 1002. Professor Saltzburg stated that "because the
[state] courts made little effort to identify and clarify the rules governing their decisions, it
[was] virtually impossible to enumerate the precise standards employed in the various juris-
dictions." Id.
88. See Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978); Commonwealth v. Da-
vis, 305 A.2d 715, 716 (Pa. 1973). See notes 116-27 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these cases.
89. Story, 383 A.2d at 162.
90. 33 A. 342 (Pa. 1895). The defendant in Bowman had been charged with murder.
Bowman, 33 A. at 342.
91. Id. The victim in this case was shot as he approached the defendant and another
man who were seated on a pile of railroad ties playing cards. Id. It was undisputed that the
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nesses testified that they had seen the appellant running from the
scene of the crime.92 In addition, the defendant himself admitted
that he had run from the scene of the crime.93 The court held that
the error committed by the trial judge was harmless because it did
not prejudice the defense.94 The court reasoned that even if all five
witnesses had testified as the trial judge erroneously stated they
had done, the defense would not have been weakened since the
witnesses' statements corresponded with the defendant's.9 5 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the error could not have misled the
jury and, as such, was harmless.9 6 However, the court failed to
enunciate any type of harmless error standard.
In 1947, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania expounded on the
harmless error doctrine in detail for the first time in Common-
wealth v. Blose.e7 The issue presented in Blose was whether the
effect of highly prejudi cial testimony erroneously blurted out by a
Commonwealth witness could be corrected by instruction to the
jury to disregard the testimony.9 In this case, the defendant was
charged with burglary.9 A police officer who had aided in appre-
hending the defendant, when asked by the district attorney if a
photograph he had used in pursuit of the appellant was an exact
likeness, responded, "[h]e is a little better looking now because it
was a penitentiary photograph.'00 The defense immediately ob-
jected and moved for the withdrawal of a juror.'0 ' This motion was
overruled but the court instructed the jury at that time, and again
in charging it, that the testimony could not be used in its
victim was killed by either the defendant or the man with whom he was playing cards. Id.
92. Id. Three other people had witnessed part of the occurrence but had not seen the
defendant and his playing partner running from the scene of the crime. Id. Under all of the
testimony presented, it was probable that the man who had been at the .scene longer had
committed the murder. Id. The strategy employed by the defense was to demonstrate that
the defendant had left the scene first. Id.
93. Id. None of the witnesses' testimony established who had actually left the scene
first. Id.
94. Id. The judge's error was not in misstating the testimony given, but merely in
stating that all five witnesses saw the appellant running from the scene of the crime when
only two had. Id. The court stated that "[t]he effect of the error, then, was not to establish a
fact prejudicial to the defense, and it was harmless, unless it tended to weaken the defense
by raising an apparent contradiction in testimony as to other material matters." Id.
95. Bowman, 33 A. at 343.
96. Id.
97. 50 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1947).
98. Blose, 50 A.2d at 744.
99. Id. at 743.





The supreme court concluded that the instructions given by the
trial court to the jury to disregard the testimony were insufficient
to dispel the prejudicial effect.10 3 In examining the harmless error
doctrine, the court determined that the inquiry could not be
merely whether there was enough evidence independent of the er-
ror to support the conviction, but rather, whether the error itself
had a substantial influence on the verdict." 4 In this case, the court
stated that it could not "say with fair assurance that the jury was
not substantially swayed by the officer's testimony" and that the
circumstances of the case indicated that there was more than a
possibility that the defendant's past criminal record was consid-
ered by the jury in rendering its verdict.1°0 Hence, the court held
that the error was not harmless, reversed the conviction, and or-
dered a new trial."°6 Thus, although a harmless error standard was
not promulgated by the court, a meaningful analysis of the doc-
trine was employed for the first time.
Finally, in 1967, on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chapman, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for the first time,
applied the harmless error standard set forth in that case in Com-
monwealth v. Pearson.'0 7 The issue before the court in Pearson
was whether the admission of illegally seized materials into evi-
dence could be deemed harmless error under the Chapman stan-
dard. 108 The defendant in this case was charged with aggravated
robbery.'0 9 The Commonwealth introduced into evidence two wal-
lets belonging to victims of the robberies that were obtained
through an illegal search and seizure of the appellant's apart-
102. Id.
103. Blose, 50 A.2d at 744. The court stated that the testimony was "incompetent and
highly prejudicial." Id.
104. Id. at 744-45. The court stated that "if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that sub-
stantial rights were not affected." Id. at 744.
105. Blose, 50 A.2d at 745.
106. Id. at 746.
107. 233 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1967).
108. Pearson, 233 A.2d at 553.
109. Id. A series of 11 armed robberies had been committed in the Philadelphia area
between November 5, 1963 and March 30, 1964. Id. It was undisputed that two men had
committed these robberies and that one had already pled guilty to them. Id. The crucial
issue at trial was whether the defendant could be identified as the accomplice in these rob-
beries. Id. The man who had already confessed to and been convicted of the robberies re-
fused to reveal the identity of his accomplice. Id.
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ment.110 The court applied the Chapman test"' to determine
whether this constitutional violation could be harmless.112 The test
required the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was not a reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction.1 13 After con-
sidering the court's charge to the jury and the Commonwealth's
emphasis on the tainted evidence, the court concluded that the
Commonwealth had not established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the evidence complained of had not contributed to the ver-
dict.1 " Hence, the court reversed the conviction and granted the
appellant a new trial.1
1 5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the Chapman ap-
proach, for the first time, to an error involving prosecutorial com-
ment on a defendant's failure to testify in Commonwealth v. Davis
in 1973.1 The appellant in Davis contended that the district at-
torney committed reversible error in making repeated references
during his closing argument to the fact that the evidence against
the defendant was "uncontroverted.1' 1 7 The court determined that
the prosecutor's comments constituted harmful error." 8 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court relied on the two general principles
established in Chapman: 1) for a federal constitutional error to be
held harmless, the court must determine that it was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt; and 2) the burden was on the Common-
wealth to establish that the error was harmless." 9 Hence, a new
110. Id. at 553-54. After the defendant was arrested by certain FBI agents at a race-
track, other agents went to his apartment and searched it without a warrant. Id. at 554.
Hence, the search was not incident to the arrest, was illegal, and, as such, the wallets ob-
tained as a product of this search should not have been admitted into evidence. Id. Accord-
ing to the appellate court, it was "apparent from the record that the Commonwealth, as well
as the trial judge in his charge to the jury, caused this illegally seized evidence to become
the most crucial element of the prosecution's case." Id. at 555.
111. See notes 83-85 and accompanying test for an explanatior of this test.
112. Pearson, 233 A.2d at 554.
113. Id. at 554.
114. Id. at 556.
115. Id.
116. 305 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1973). Justice Roberts wrote for the majority; Justices Pomeroy
and Eagen concurred in the result; and Chief Justice Jones dissented. Davis, 305 A.2d at
715.
117. Id. at 717. The record demonstrated the prosecutor's repeated use of the word
"uncontroverted." Id. The defendant in Davis was convicted of murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, and two counts of robbery. Id. at 716. The defendant was sentenced to death and
post-trial motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied. Id. at 716-17.
118. Id. at 719.
119. Id. at 718-19. In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that the Common-
wealth had not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error in the
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trial was ordered.'2 0
Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania extended the fed-
eral "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard promulgated in Chap-
man to errors involving state law in Commonwealth v. Story.'2'
The errors committed in Story were in derogation of state evidence
law rather than federal constitutional law.'22 Consequently, the
court stated that it had not previously articulated a consistent
harmless error standard as a matter of state law.' 23 As a means of
eliminating any further confusion as to the proper standard, the
court elected to adopt the same standard it applied to federal con-
stitutional errors; the standard developed in Chapman.124 Further-
more, the court held that an error could not be found to be harm-
case was harmless. Id. at 720. The court stated that:
The Commonwealth, during its closing address to the jury, thoroughly exploited ap-
pellant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to take the witness stand. . . [in
arguing] that "under the uncontroverted facts the Commonwealth has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that this defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree and
robbery."
Id.
Hence, the court concluded that there was "a reasonable possibility [that these com-
ments] 'might have contributed to the conviction'." Id.
120. Id. at 718.
121. 383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978). Story involved the killing of a police officer. Story,
383 A.2d at 156. The appellant was convicted of the murder and sentenced to death. Id. at
155-56. The trial court erroneously permitted admission of evidence concerning the victim's
family life and professional reputation. Id. at 157. This evidence established that the victim
had left a widow and a child behind and that the victim was well respected within the
community in which he worked. Id. at 157, 161. The appellant objected to this evidence on
the grounds that it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Id. at 158, 160-61. The Common-
wealth contended that these errors were harmless. Id. at 162.
122. Id. at 162. The court stated that in order for evidence to be admissible, it must be
shown to be relevant and have probative value. Id. at 158. It went on to add that "[iut is well
established that the Commonwealth cannot offer evidence of the victim's reputation unless
and until the victim's reputation is put in issue by the defense." Id. at 161. The court con-
cluded that the evidence in question bore no relevance to the question of the appellant's
guilt or innocence, but instead, only served to create sympathy for the victim and inflame
the jury and as such, was erroneously admitted by the trial court. Id.
123. Id. at 162. The court recognized, however, that "[w]here a trial error violates the
federal constitution, this Court, at a minimum, must employ the federal harmless error
rule." Id.
124. Id. The court reiterated this standard as "an error can be harmless only if the
appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless." Id. Four
considerations were delineated by the court for applying this standard. Id. at 162-64. These
considerations were that the standard was equivalent to the standard of proof in criminal
law, that the line between constitutional and non-constitutional issues was often blurred,
that in the end it was irrelevant whether an error was constitutional or not in determining
whether the error was prejudicial to the defendant, and that a rule which is too lenient may
undermine the interests and policies promoted by constitutional and non-constitutional
rules. Id. at 162-63.
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less unless the court determined that the error did not contribute
to the verdict.'25
Additionally, the court examined whether an error could be
found harmless when there was properly admitted overwhelming
evidence of guilt.1 28 Consequently, the court held that unless such
evidence was uncontradicted, the court could not conclude, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the improperly admitted evidence did not
contribute to the verdict. 27
Hence, it appeared that Davis and Story paved the way for the
supreme court's holding in Rodriguez. In many ways, the basis for
the court's holding in Rodriguez was connected to the evolution of
the federal harmless error standard, which had a profound influ-
ence on the evolution of the harmless error standard in Pennsylva-
nia. In Rodriguez, the court utilized the analysis it had previously
employed in both Davis and Story to determine that the decision
reached by the superior court was erroneous. 28 Interestingly, the
harmless error standard set forth in those Pennsylvania cases was
predicated on the federal harmless error standard enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griffin and Chapman.29
Once the court determined that the superior court had erred in
its application of the harmless error analysis, it proceeded with a
proper harmless error analysis. 30 The court, relying on the reason-
ing advanced in Davis, emphasized that when an error is of consti-
tutional proportions, a conclusion that the error is harmless cannot
be drawn without much consideration.' 3' The underlying authority
for this principle, as outlined by the court in Davis, is rooted in a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions including Griffin
and Chapman. Thus, the connection between the federal harmless
error standard and the Pennsylvania harmless error standard is
once again evidenced by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's reli-
ance on United States Supreme Court decisions.
125. Id. at 164.
126. Story, 383 A.2d at 165. The court stated that "[a]n error which, viewed by itself,
is not minimal, may nonetheless be harmless if properly admitted evidence is substantially
similar to the erroneously admitted evidence." Id. The theory underlying this approach is
that the tainted evidence added nothing to the government's case and the error is therefore
harmless. Id.
127. Id. at 168. In this case, the court concluded that the Commonwealth had not
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless as the "evidence claimed
to be overwhelming was in fact disputed." Id.
128. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 144.
129. See notes 72-86 and accompanying text.




Ultimately, the court in Rodriguez found both the prosecutor's
incessant comments on the defendant's failure to testify and the
internal contradictions in the Commonwealth's case determinative
in holding that it was reasonably possible that the jury had con-
cluded that the defendant's failure to testify was an indication of
guilt.'32 Although the court did not clearly state it, this is undoubt-
edly an application of the federal harmless error rule as set forth in
Chapman.'"3 It appears that the federal harmless error rule has
become so embroiled in the Pennsylvania standard that the two
are virtually indistinguishable.
This author believes that the court's reliance on its previous
holding in Story, concerning a state law error, to decide Rodriguez,
concerning a constitutional error, demonstrated adoption by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of a clear and concrete harmless
error standard that may be applicable in a broad range of cases.
Specifically, the standard may be applied to all harmless error
questions whether the error involves a constitutional or state law
question. Undoubtedly, this clear-cut harmless error standard will
promote judicial efficiency. In the future, when the courts of Penn-
sylvania are confronted with a harmless error issue, it seems there
should be little question as to what type of analysis to employ.
It is also important to note that in concluding its opinion, the
court in Rodriguez added that it deemed prosecutor comment on a
defendant's failure to testify to be an error of such significant mag-
nitude that such comment could not be found to be harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.3 Accordingly, one can gather that the
court's enunciation of this opinion will, in the future, have a deter-
rent effect on the actions and comments of prosecutors in Pennsyl-
vania. Possibly, this will serve to reduce the number of reversible
errors committed at the trial level in criminal cases.
Renee E. Solomon
132. Id. at 146.
133. See notes 78-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chapman.
134. Rodriguez, 626 A.2d at 146.
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